Global Airlines - Not A Fair Playing Ground, But Necessary

US Airlines are known for attacking foreign long-haul carriers, often attributing their success solely to the government subsidies that these carriers receive. Please answer the following questions:

1) Describe the US-UAE Open Skies Agreement. List and describe two long-haul carriers that are a part of this agreement that also receive government subsidies.

Open Skies agreements are bilateral agreements that the U.S. Government negotiates with other countries (and in this case the UAE) to provide rights for (typically foreign) airlines to offer air transportation services such as international passenger and cargo services (U.S. Department of State 2017). The overall goal of these Open Skies agreements are to promote consumerism, competition, and growth of both the air transportation industry and the U.S. economy. Currently, experts estimate that Open Skies agreements will increase the annual economic consumer gains by approximately $4 billion, which is a substantial increase and will only benefit the U.S. economy (U.S. Department of State 2017). This promotion and stimulation of the industry (and economy) is facilitated through the expansion of international passenger and cargo flights by eliminating the concept of governmental control in commercial airline decisions. These decisions made by the commercial airlines are focused around routes, capacity, and pricing. Thus, the reason why the commercial airlines want to remove the notion of governmental control in their decision-making process is so that they (the commercial airlines) can provide more affordable, passenger friendly and convenient, and efficient/effective air transport services to the traveling public. Consequently, (without government control), the promotion of increased travel and trade, high-quality job creation, and economic growth will transpire, ergo industry- and U.S. economy wide stimulation will occur. From a general perspective, Open Skies agreements serve many purposes that benefit the U.S. in terms of finances and safety. Specifically, these agreements assist in the expansion of cooperative marketing opportunities between airlines, aid in the liberalization of charter regulations, improve flexibility for airlines operations, and ensure both governments (e.g. the U.S. and UAE) commit and maintain to a high level of safety and security to sustain the air transport continuity (U.S. Department of State 2017).

Open Skies agreements have been in existence since 1992, and has grown significantly since then; currently, the U.S. has Open Skies agreements with 120 foreign partners. More recently, the U.S. finalized agreements with several counties such as Ukraine, Serbia, Cote d’ Ivoire, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and several other countries (U.S. Department of State 2017). Additionally, the U.S. finalized a modernized air transport agreement with Mexico, of which seems to be a promising feat and will potentially provide both an economic and working relationship benefit for the counties involved (i.e. U.S. and Mexico).

Traditionally, the U.S. Open Skies agreements have been directly correlated and/or associated with the concept of airline globalization, and for good reason. These agreements, at their essence, provide maximum operational flexibility for all airlines involved (U.S. Department of State 2017). Therefore, by allowing the involved airlines unlimited access to each other’s markets, which includes providing services to intermediate locations, airline globalization and foreign relations are enhanced because of this notion of ‘route flexibility’ that is created by the agreements. However, these bilateral Open Skies agreements are not the only ‘contracts’ the U.S. has established. The U.S. established and negotiated two multilateral agreements, one in 2001, and the other in 2007. The Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalization of International Air Transportation (MALIAT) occurred in 2001, and was formed with New Zealand, Singapore, Brunei, Chile, Samoa, Tonga, and Mongolia (U.S. Department of State 2017). The second multilateral agreement occurred in 2007, and is known as the Air Transport Agreement with the European Community. This agreement consists of negotiations between the U.S. and the European Community, including its 27 member states.

The US-UAE Open Skies Agreement is one that is causing a tremendous amount of controversy within the aviation industry, especially the commercial facet. The primary companies spearheading the US-UAE agreement are Delta Air Lines, United, and American, who are also known as the ‘Big 3’. The United Arab Emirates, or UAE, is a Constitutional Federation composed of seven emirates, which are as follows: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Ras Al Khaimah, and Fujairah (UAE Government 2017). The US-UAE Open Skies Agreement is essentially a bilateral contract between the U.S. and the seven emirates previously mentioned. This agreement between these two governments allows their respective air carriers to travel in/through and provide air carrier services within each other’s country with no specified limit. Essentially, the US-UAE Open Skies agreement grants the U.S. unlimited access and the right to fly in/through, establish routes, and service the traveling public community within the seven emirates composing the UAE, and allows the three major UAE airlines to do the same in the U.S. The fact that the three major UAE airlines, namely Emirates, Etihad Airlines and Qatar Airways are given unlimited access in terms of ‘route freedom’ within the U.S. and are subsidized for it, is the primary reason why U.S carriers such as Delta Air Lines are opposing the Open Skies agreements.

Two long-haul carriers that are a part of the US-UAE Open Skies agreement and receive government subsidies are Emirates and Qatar Airways. As mentioned previously, because of the US-UAE agreement, long-haul carriers like Emirates and Qatar can fly into the U.S. and service the traveling public as much as they want as well as receive government subsidies for doing so, which has imposed an unfair advantage on U.S. carriers. For instance, because of the US-UAE agreement, Emirates can fly/service nine U.S. cities from its hub located in Dubai, while Delta Air Lines and United each only have one (daily) flight to Dubai and none to Abu Dhabi (Mouawad 2015). It is this significantly large 9:1 ratio that has U.S. carriers like Delta Air Lines and United extremely upset and leading the charge against the Open Skies agreement because of the disadvantage U.S. carriers are facing, primarily manifesting in the forms of financial decline and increased competition. According to Mouawad (2015), the first Open-Skies agreements formed between the U.S. and the UAE occurred in 1999. In 2014, the U.S. established a customs and immigration pre-clearance facility in the Abu Dhabi airport. The establishment of a customs facility enables passengers flying into the U.S. to clear immigration prior to the flight (Mouawad 2015). This decision to create a customs and pre-screening facility did not sit well with U.S. carriers, and is yet another reason for their opposition. Their frustration however, is warranted because the new facility essentially allows passengers to ‘circumvent’ TSA and/or other security protocol, which notably reduces the security and safety of the air carriers, airport personnel, and traveling public.

The first of the two long-haul carriers that are currently a part of the US-UAE Open-Skies agreement and receiving a government subsidy is Emirates. According to Culp (2016), Emirates Airlines is an airline that is (now) entirely owned and operated by the Government of Dubai, provides commercial passenger service, is based out of Dubai, and has been in existence since 1985. Emirates Airlines currently provides air transport services to numerous cities on six continents and offers nonstop flights from Dubai to several U.S. cities such as New York, Houston, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. To facilitate and accommodate the needs of its consumer base, Emirates Airlines uses a fleet composed of the Boeing 777, Airbus A330, and Airbus A340 (Culp 2016). The other, long-haul carrier that is currently a part of the US-UAE Open-Skies agreement and receives a government subsidy is Qatar Airways. Established in 1997, Qatar Airways is the national carrier for the State of Qatar in addition to being one of the fastest growing airlines operating one the youngest fleets in the world (Qatar Airways 2017). Qatar Airways provides air carrier services to over 150 destinations, some of which include South Asia, South America, and the Asian Pacific. To date, Qatar Airways fulfills its duties as an air carrier (both passenger and cargo) via operation of 194 total aircraft, 109 of which being Airbus aircraft, while the remaining 85 aircraft are Boeing. This number however, does not include the airlines 11 Bombardier and Gulfstream aircraft utilized for corporate purposes only (Qatar Airways 2017). With that many aircraft and destinations, a substantial number of employees are necessary to ensure smooth operations, of which Qatar Airways employs more than 44,000 employees (worldwide), 30,000 being airline personnel.

2) Do any long-haul US carriers receive subsidies or have received subsidies in the past? If so, which airlines? Why?

I do not believe that there are any current long-haul U.S. carriers receiving government subsidies, however the same cannot be said for those in the past. When the concept of commercial aviation first transpired, it was in the form of ‘air mail’. The Airmail, or Kelly Act of 1925, authorized the United States Postal Service (USPS) to contract air mail routes (CAM routes) to private airlines in order to deliver the mail (Leff 2016). The airlines were paid based off how much mail (in terms of weight) they could carry, which led to said airlines mailing object such as bricks, in efforts to increase their revenues. The most notable airlines that were awarded the initial CAM route contracts from the Airmail Act of 1925, were American Airways (later American Airlines) and United Aircraft (later United Airlines). After the Air Mail Act of 1930, and the subsequent ‘Spoils Conference’, the Postmaster General consolidated the various CAM routes and awarded the routes to only three carriers, which significantly reduced the competition. The airlines that were awarded the routes were as follows: United Airlines (northern route), Transcontinental and Western Air (TWA; mid-US route), and American Airways (later American Airlines; southern route) (AvStop.com 2017). Furthermore, according to Leff (2016), American Airlines received governmental support (i.e. a subsidy) from the Roosevelt Administration’s Reconstruction Finance Corporation during its first major aircraft order. Therefore, two of the three long-haul U.S. carriers, namely United and American Airlines were essentially born and nurtured from varying government subsidies during the 1930’s for operating the CAM routes and delivering mail (which at first was based on weight, then later, volume). The operation of the CAM routes back in the thirties by United and American airlines during their infancy denotes the origins of ‘commercial aviation’ as we know it today.

3) Another complaint is that long-haul foreign carriers have made aircraft purchases at "below market interest rates" that are unavailable to US carriers. How is this possible? Please discuss the Export-Import Bank.

Long-haul foreign carriers are able to make aircraft purchases at "below market interest rates" that are unavailable to U.S. carriers because of how the Export-Import Bank of the United States is set up regarding the exclusive allocation of ‘special interest rates’ to foreign carriers. The Export-Import Bank of the United States, or EXIM, is an independent, self-sustaining agency with an 82-year record of supporting American jobs via financing the export of U.S. goods and services (Export-Import Bank of the United States 2016). It is because of the policies and procedures governing the EXIM bank that foreign-owned carriers are able to purchase aircraft at rates that are significantly below the market interest rate (i.e. the rate U.S. carriers must pay). Specifically, the attainment of such low interest rates by foreign-carriers is made possible through the new aviation large aircraft policy. This policy enables EXIM to finance the export of U.S. produced goods (e.g. aircraft) and services for aftermarket (i.e. post-manufacturing) use on foreign-manufactured large aircraft for U.S. exporters of all sizes (Export-Import Bank of the United States 2016). In addition to receiving low market interest rates, foreign-owned carriers, especially those in the Gulf regions, do not pay taxes at all, as opposed to U.S. air carriers who pay relatively high tax rates (Harress 2013). Thus, because of EXIM policies, there are low rate interest loans that are only available to foreign-owned airlines, which U.S. carriers do not think is fair since they are not only required to pay a high tax rate (while foreign-carriers are not taxed), but they are also only eligible for the (relatively high) ‘market rate’ interest loans.

4) Are there any current issues with Norwegian International Airlines and the Open Skies Agreement?

Norwegian Air Shuttle (the parent company of Norwegian International Airlines) faced a tremendous amount of opposition from U.S. air carriers and their respective lobby groups during their request to expand low-cost flight from Europe and Asia (Mouawad 2015). Their appeal to the U.S. Department of State to be granted an Open Skies agreement received a considerable amount of pushback and negativity from U.S. carriers, primarily the ‘big 3’ (e.g. Delta Air Lines, United, and American), so much in fact that their application was delayed. Initially, Norwegian International Airlines applied to the U.S. Department of State for an Open Skies agreement in December 2013, as its parent company, Norwegian Air Shuttle (a low-cost carrier) already established several routes at U.S. airports (Jansen 2016). Typically, when a foreign-carrier applies for an agreement, the process is rather fastidious, but requires nothing out of the ordinary. However, in the case of Norwegian International Airlines (i.e. Norwegian Air Shuttle), this process was not seamless and was delayed by accusations from the ‘big 3’, who claimed the Norwegian airline was attempting to bypass labor and safety laws (Jansen 2016). According to Jansen (2016), this attempted ‘bypass’ would be accomplished by Norwegian International Airlines having their headquarters in Ireland and hiring Asian employees at a below-market wage. With such strong claims and detailed plans made by the big 3, the U.S. Department of State had no choice but to delay the agreement until the claims could be investigated and a conclusion reached. Obviously, if the U.S. were to disregard such a claim regarding a foreign-carrier, the integrity and reputation of the department would be damaged significantly, potentially causing any current (or future) Open Skies agreements to be suspended (or prevented). However, after thorough investigation and review of both Norwegian International Airlines policy/plan and the U.S. agreement, the U.S. Department of State concluded they had no reason to reject the application as the concerns regarding the hiring/employment practices were adequately addressed and no laws were being broken. Albeit Delta Air Lines, United, and American were strongly against and opposed Norwegian International Airlines application for an agreement, there efforts were to no avail.

5) Finally, critically analyzing the above information, do you feel that the global "playing field" of long-haul carriers is fair?

After critically analyzing the information above in conjunction with the numerous sources I conferred while conducting my research, I do not feel as if the global ‘playing field’ of long-haul carriers is fair. However, albeit I do not believe it is fair, I do believe it is necessary in stimulating (and improving) our economy.

Being able to purchase a wide-body aircraft at a ‘discounted’ price with no taxes is already unfair, but manageable/tolerable (by U.S. carriers). However, the fact that foreign carriers are doing so at an alarming rate to take advantage of the unlimited access to service the U.S. market is absurd. Subsequently, purchasing several aircraft at a time to increase the number of flights diminishes (or dilutes) the competition by beating U.S. carriers (air fares), thus placing said carriers (e.g. Delta Air Lines, United, and American) at a severe disadvantage via unfair competition. This dilution of competition is illustrated by a ratio I mentioned in an earlier response, specifically regarding the number of flights Emirates operates to that of Delta Air Lines and United. Emirates currently provides air service to nine U.S. cities from its hub located in Dubai, while Delta Air Lines and United each only have one (daily) flight to Dubai and none to Abu Dhabi. This 9:1 ratio denotes only one aspect of the unfair (competition) advantage foreign-carriers impose on U.S. carriers, ergo why I strongly believe the global ‘playing field’ is imbalanced.

The fact foreign-carriers are not taxed, but U.S. carriers are (at a high rate) is another unfair advantage imposed against U.S. carriers. This fact, in conjunction with ‘special interest rate loans’ (via EXIM) only applicable to foreign-owned carriers are primary reasons as to why the ‘playing field’ is tilted in favor of foreign-carriers. Therefore, to balance the ‘playing field’, I believe the tax rates accessed to U.S. carriers should be revised (slightly) or foreign-carriers should be taxed at least half of the current U.S. air carrier tax rate. Additionally, the policies governing the EXIM bank should be amended to allow U.S. carriers to be eligible for interest rate loans somewhat akin to those of foreign carriers. I realize the prescribed actions above may not transpire and/or solve anything, but they are more so a sign of good faith, demonstrate a willingness to resolve conflict and ease tensions, as well as denote an understanding of the sentiments expressed by both parties.

As I mentioned earlier, certain aspects of this ‘playing field’ are necessary as the US-UAE Open Skies agreement have promoted consumerism, competition, and (economic and aviation industry) growth. That said, this agreement may be one of the instance where U.S. carriers are forced to take the good with the bad and the ugly.

Enjoy!

References

AvStop.Com. (2017). The Airmail Act of 1930. Aviation Online Magazine. Retrieved from http://avstop.com/history/needregulations/act1930.htm

Culp, B. (2016). Information about Emirates Airline. USA Today. Retrieved from http://traveltips.usatoday.com/information-emirates-airline-21521.html

Export-Import Bank of the United States. (2016). The aviation exports policy. Export-Import Bank of the United States. Retrieved from http://www.exim.gov/policies/aviation-exports

Export-Import Bank of the United States. (2016). The facts about EXIM Bank. Export-Import Bank of the United States. Retrieved from http://www.exim.gov/about/facts-about-ex-im-bank

Harress, C. (2013). Why does Washington favor foreign airlines over US carriers? Low-interest-rate loans available only to non-US airlines hurt US carriers. IBTimes. Retrieved from http://www.ibtimes.com/why-does-washington-favor-foreign-airlines-over-us-carriers-low-interest-rate-loans-1474416

Jansen, B. (2016). DOT approves contested Norwegian Air flights. USA Today. Retrieved from http://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/flights/todayinthesky/2016/12/02/dot-approves-contested-norwegian-air-flights/94838292/

Leff, G. (2016). Total loss for heavily subsidized US airlines against the big Gulf carriers. View From The Wing. Retrieved from http://viewfromthewing.boardingarea.com/2016/07/26/us-airlines-lose-case-against-gulf-carriers/

Mouawad, J. (2015). Open-skies agreements challenged. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/07/business/us-airlines-challenge-open-skies-agreements.html?_r=0

Qatar Airways. (2017). Qatar Airways fact sheet. Qatar Airways Media Release. Retrieved from https://www.qatarairways.com/iwov-resources/temp-docs/press-kit/Qatar%20Airways%20Factsheet%20-%20English.pdf

UAE Government. (2017). Seven Emirates. The Official Portal of the UAE Government. Retrieved from http://government.ae/en/seven-emirates

U.S. Department of State. (2017). Open skies agreements. Promoting Global Travel and Transportation. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tra/ata/

U.S. Department of State. (2017). Open skies partnerships: expanding the benefits of freer commercial aviation. Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/fs/2017/267131.htm

COMAC, A Chinese Competitor to Boeing and Airbus

On Monday, November 2, 2015, the first Chinese larger-airliner aircraft rolled out - the C919. This aircraft was built by COMAC (Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China) and will compete with the A320 and the B737, seating about 168 passengers. Although the hope is for western certification, the C919 has yet to be FAA-certified, currently limiting the countries where the aircraft can operate. Given this information, please answer the following questions:

1) Do you believe that the C919 will ever receive FAA certification? Why or why not?

Yes, I do believe the C919 will receive FAA certification, specifically 5-10 years from now, but no later than 2030. I believe the C919 will receive FAA certification because the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC) has put forth a tremendous amount of effort in creating this aircraft in accordance with the manufacturing and certification stipulations required by the FAA. The Chinese aviation authority is also viewed as being more stringent than the FAA.  therefore, by abiding by the heightened requirements established by the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC), the C919 should exceed FAA expectations with relative ease. This however, has not been the case.

I also believe the C919 will eventually receive FAA certification because the CAAC has a Bilateral Air Safety Agreement with the FAA that allows the FAA to coach, supervise, and guide the CAAC during their manufacturing and certification processes of the C919 (and ARJ21) (Perrett 2013). Since this agreement allows the FAA to provide extensive guidance throughout the entire certification process, the CAAC has all the tools and resources (both monetary and technical) at their disposal to comply with the FAA certification requirements. With this agreement in place, the CAAC essentially has ‘24/7 technical support’ in the form of the FAA since the FAA is partaking in an ‘oversight’ role during this certification process of the C919. Due to the fact the FAA is merely ‘overseeing’ the process, this means the CAAC is engaged in the ‘implementation’ role, or implementing the necessary corrective actions in accordance with FAA requirements to attain their certification. If an error, mistake, or other mishap occurs during the certification process, the CAAC has the freedom to contact the FAA rather quickly because of the Bilateral Air Safety Agreement, rather than having to wait for a response and further delay production. Therefore, with the FAA ‘overseeing’ and coaching the CAAC through their creation and certification of the C919, there is no reason why the aircraft should not become certified by the FAA.

China based C919 customers have also expressed an extreme desire for the aircraft to receive an FAA endorsement despite the fact the certification is not required for operation in China (Perrett 2013). This yearn for the FAA certification by Chinese based customers only strengthens my belief that the C919 will eventually receive certification. The strong support demonstrated from the various clientele and other lobby-groups based in China aids in their application for FAA certification because it shows faith in their country, air transport industry, and the CAAC. This strong sense of moral support can also transpire into financial support if additional monetary resources are required to attain said certification in the event of additional paperwork, component upgrades/tweaks, testing or inspections, etc. Furthermore, I believe the desire shown by C919 customers to attain this FAA certification stems from the belief that having it (and not needing it) will denote the aircraft (and airline) are extremely safe and reliable because of they hold the FAA’s ‘seal of approval’. Subsequently, the public perception in China and worldwide will shift towards the positive side as consumers will be more inclined to travel on an aircraft certified by more than one aviation authority, especially if it is the FAA. Therefore, I believe the C919 will eventually be certified due to the extensive support and rallying for it to happen because China realizes and understand the long-term benefit of doing so will have.

Recently, the C919 progressed towards attaining its FAA certification as its CFM Leap-1C engine received type certificates from both the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the FAA. In fact, the simultaneous certification awarded by both the EASA and the FAA to CFM for their engines was the first-time (simultaneous) dual certification to an engine company has occurred (Polek 2016). Typically, one type certification is awarded by one aviation agency/authority and the other agency/authority validates (or confirms) the initial type certificate (Polek 2016). Thus, this break in regulatory certification tradition is an indefinite (positive) accomplishment for CFM, CAAC, and the C919 as the increased reputation will assist with the remainder of the certification process. Even if the C919 is certified piece-by-piece, which would take much longer, the aircraft and the CAAC are making progress towards complete certification. Therefore, the fact the C919 (CFM) engines were simultaneously awarded type certificates from two notable aviation authorities, namely the EASA and FAA, is yet another (undeniable) reason why I believe the C919 will receive certification entirely.

2) For sake of argument, if the C919 receives FAA certification, what challenges do you see for US carriers? Look at various aspects - for example, what would in mean in terms of aircraft purchases? What would it mean in terms of public perception?

If the C919 receives FAA certification, the challenges I expect U.S. carrier to encounter are orientated around the relatively immediate competition the aircraft will create in terms of aircraft pricing and purchasing as well as operating costs. According to the SCMP Staff (2017), the average estimated cost of a C919 is $36 million, which is $9 million less than that of the cost of an Airbus 320 (or an akin B737) valued at $45 million. The C919 provides a cheaper alternative with relatively similar amenities such as passenger seating (approx. 168) to the aviation industry. This coupled with the fact that CAAC has a currency advantage over the United States, meaning that if the Yuan remains lower than the U.S. dollar, then the C919 (because it is manufactured in China) will have a significant cost-advantage over rival aircraft manufacturers, namely Airbus and Boeing (Mushaike 2015). Therefore, if major U.S. airlines can purchase an aircraft that offers a similar passenger carrying capacity, fly the same routes, and operate for relatively the same cost, but at a cheaper price ($36 million compared to $45 million), and still receive a ‘discount’ due to China’s currency advantage, there is no contest. Big businesses will always do what is most optimal for their bottom line, and if purchasing the C919 rather than an Airbus or Boeing aircraft will save them money, then U.S. carriers will inherit a dynamic challenge from the CAAC in terms of competition, viability, and manufacturing longevity. Consequently, U.S. carrier such as Airbus and Boeing will experience a decline in aircraft purchases because of the less expensive C919 alternative, and the only method to counter that is by ‘price matching’ the C919, which may prove to be extremely cost-ineffective for U.S. carriers.

Additionally, the birth and certification of the C919 will create another problem for U.S. carriers, primarily in the form of the hindrance of aviation growth potential in China. Since the C919 will have the ‘home-field advantage’ in China, U.S. carriers will already be at a disadvantage since Chinse carriers will innately want to buy and operate their own aircraft rather than a U.S. based one (Mushaike 2015). Furthermore, (if/when) the C919 receives its FAA certification, Chinese airlines will see no reason to buy from U.S. carriers because the C919 has received the FAA ‘seal of approval’ and will be viewed as just as good, if not better than its U.S. counterparts. Thus, as the C919 becomes widely accepted by the Chinese aviation industry and is utilized by other aviation organizations worldwide, its reputation will increase, further diminishing the growth potential in China (and potentially other countries) for U.S. carrier such as Boeing, resulting in a decline in their aircraft sales/purchases.

The concept of safety and the public’s perception of it will always be a challenge for air carriers, and if the C919 receives FAA certification and is adopted by U.S. carriers, said carriers may be placed at a disadvantage because of this (safety) challenge. Albeit the C919 was manufactured in China, most its core components were manufactured in 16 foreign companies (SCMP Staff 2017). Most U.S. citizens that travel via air frequently and/or have some knowledge regarding aviation or the FAA are innately skeptical of any aircraft not made in the U.S., or has not been in service for a long period of time. The fact the C919 has encountered numerous delays (translating into several years) to become certified, will create negative public perception regarding the integrity of the CAAC/COMAC and its ‘airworthiness’. Additionally, since the C919 contains core (or essential) components that were manufactured by 16 different companies, only heightens public skepticism and subsequent negative public perception of the aircraft. This sense of ‘skepticism’ is not unwarranted though because the manufacturing practices and policies can differ significantly across 16 companies, and if one company conforms to a lower manufacturing process than the others, the entire aircraft can be unsafe and fail. Despite the C919 receiving FAA certification, if the C919 is operated by U.S. carriers in the future, the traveling public will always maintain a negative perception of the aircraft’s integrity and airworthiness because it was not made in the U.S. and is composed of foreign components.

3) Discuss COMAC a little and its relationship with the Chinese airlines and the Chinese government. Are there other aircraft in the works? If so, what are the specifics?

The Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China, or COMAC, is stated-owed aerospace manufacturer that was established on May 11, 2008, and based out of Shanghai, China. The Chinese government consolidated its manufacturing efforts in 2008, with the establishment of COMAC (RAND Corporation 2014). The purpose of COMAC was two-fold: One, its creation was the Chinese government’s way to compete with Western aircraft manufacturers such as Airbus and Boeing in efforts to diversify the (commercial) market. The second being to not only prove that China’s aviation/aerospace programs and technology could more than compete with those of Western carriers and manufacturers, but to also build two aircraft that would domestically service China, namely the ARJ-21 and the more recent C919.

COMAC is a specific sector (i.e. commercial) of Chinese aviation. It is housed and regulated by the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC), who is subsequently governed by the Chinese government. The Chinese government currently oversees/governs/regulates the air transport industry and China’s three major airlines, namely Air China, China Southern Airlines Co., and Chine Eastern Airlines Corp (Kung & Kim 2016). COMAC has been applying to the FAA to receive certification because the FAA does not recognize the CAAC as an ‘aviation certifying organization’ because of their difference in manufacturing policies, safety protocol, and other aircraft related certification requirements. However, since the C919 does not require any special type certificates to fly/service domestically (i.e. in China), COMAC would only need to appeal/apply to the CAAC for aircraft certification, of which the CAAC could either issue or refuse (in this case issue) the proper certifications allowing the C919 to be used in Chinese air operations. To serve as a direct comparison, COMAC is akin to any U.S. commercial carrier (e.g. Delta Air Lines) operating under Part 121 regulations. COMAC being a commercial aviation entity is regulated or governed by the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC). In the U.S., said commercial (Part 121) carriers are regulated by an aviation authority known as the FAA. Thereby, airlines operating within COMAC must seek certification from the CAAC, just as Delta Air Lines and other (Part 121) operators must seek certification from the FAA. Lastly, the Chinese government oversees and regulates the entire aviation industry, which is akin to how the Department of Transportation (DOT) is responsible for governing the FAA and U.S. aviation industry.

The other Chinese aircraft I discovered to be in the works (since it has yet to be certified by the FAA) is the ARJ21-700. Prior to the manufacturer and release of the C919, COMAC’s very first aircraft was a regional jet known as the ARJ21-700. The ARJ21-700 was China’s first modern commercial jet and was built primarily to empower China as key player in the commercial aircraft market (to compete with companies such as Airbus and Boeing). The aircraft conducted its maiden flight in June 2016, carrying 70 passengers on a two-hour flight (Mutzabaugh 2016).

According to Mutzabaugh (2016), the name ‘ARJ21’ is short for Asian Regional Jet for the 21^st Century. The ARJ21 can seat up to 90 passengers and travel a range of approximately 1,300 miles, which is common amongst other reputable regional jet aircraft. The body design of this particular aircraft was based off the McDonnell Douglas MD-90, which can be seen by the shape of the fuselage and twin, rear-mounted engines. Furthermore, the ARJ21 is primarily composed of foreign technology/avionics and other system components, which includes companies like Rockwell Collins, engines from General Electric, and wings (design) from Ukraine’s Antonov State Co (Mutzabaugh 2016).

4) If this aircraft were to receive FAA certification, do you feel that other companies would enter the market as competitors to Boeing and Airbus?

If this aircraft were to receive FAA certification, I feel that other companies would be extremely reluctant to enter the marker as competitors to Boeing and Airbus. The C919 (and ARJ21) and COMAC have struggled to receive type certifications from the FAA and EASA, which has caused numerous production setbacks and delays in the aircraft’s debut. In addition, the CAAC is not recognized by the FAA, which has only made attaining type certification more difficult and caused further delays. Within the past year, the C919 CFM engine received simultaneous type certificates from both the FAA and EASA, which until now, was an unheard feat for an engine company. However, the engines becoming type certified is only one piece of the puzzle as COMAC is still struggling to abide by the FAA requirements and get their aircraft certified by the Western aviation authority. With that said, I feel as if other companies that would potentially consider entering the market have become severely discouraged after witnessing the numerous the struggles and setbacks encountered by COMAC and CAAC regarding their C919. After witnessing delay after delay, I think any company that would want to enter the market will decide to either wait until the C919 is fully certified (to learn from its mistakes during the certification process) or ‘cut their losses’ early as they deem it not worth the hassle or (monetary) resources. Thus, I strongly believe that other companies wanting to enter the market will wait five to fifteen years to learn from COMAC’s struggles, see if/how the regulations or requirements change (for better or for worse), and only enter when the industry is optimal for their viability.

5) Finally, has Boeing or Airbus responded to this rollout in any way?

Both Boeing and Airbus have responded to the rollout of the C919 in an economically competitive manner, specifically by deciding to re-engine their respective aircraft. Both companies considered the idea to re-engine their aircraft around 2010, but decided not to, however due to the rollout of the C919, Airbus and Boeing changed their mind to remain competitive and demonstrate ‘air superiority’.

With respects to re-engine, Boeing is planning to place a larger engine on their 737, which will increase its range and capacity (Minkoff 2016). The re-engine of the 737 (to the 737 MAX) will be done to compete not only with the C919, but also with Airbus’s A321neo, which is currently outselling the 737 by a ratio of 4:1 (Minkoff 2016). To re-engine the 737, Boeing plans to swap the current CFM56 engines out for the LEAP-1A engine. Boeing however, has not committed to perform the re-engine process because doing so would require potential reconfiguration and re-certification of some of the 737’s components and a at a cost of approximately $1 billion - $2 billion (Minkoff 2016). Specifically, to fit the new LEAP-1A engines, Boeing would have to re-position the landing gear and conduct re-certification of the affected parts, which would cost them a significant amount of money (in terms of parts/labor and loss of revenues), time, and other resources.

Airbus has also opted to re-engine their family of aircraft, denoted by the name NEO, or New Engine Option. The new and improved A319, A320, and A321 will be equipped with either the Pratt & Whitney PurePower PW1100G-JM or the CFM International LEAP-1A, sharklet wingtip components, and contain additional cabin space (Airbus 2017). The type of engine (either a PW or CFM) will vary depending upon the purchasing air carrier. Additionally, the new engine options (NEO) equipped on the Airbus aircraft will cause air carrier’s utilizing the aircraft to save approximately 20% in fuel costs per seat by year 2020, in comparison to the current engines equipped on the Airbus aircraft (Airbus 2017). The NEO will also significantly increase Airbus aircraft performance, specifically in regards to their payload capacity, range, and engine noise and fume emissions. With the NEO equipped, the A319s, A320s, and A321s will increase their overall payloads by 2 tons, extend their range up to 500 nautical miles (NM), and reduce the amount of engine noise and emission(s), and lower operating costs (in terms of fuel and maintenance) for air carriers (Airbus 2017).

Therefore, unlike Boeing, Airbus has chosen to respond to the C919 rollout and Boeing’s re-engine process in a more holistic fashion, specifically through re-engine, enhanced wing tips and performance, increased cabin space and payload capacity, extended range, and reduced engine noise and fume emission at a lower cost to the carrier (and subsequent passengers). Airbus’s actions and design decisions will indefinitely increase their advantage over Boeing and the C919, allowing them to remain more than competitive in the aviation industry, and not to mention, was an excellent way to respond to the rollout.

References

Airbus. (2017). A320NEO. Airbus Commercial Aircraft. Retrieved from http://www.airbus.com/presscentre/hot-topics/a320neo/

Kung, M. C., & Kim, K. (2016). Three biggest China airlines face $1.3 billion currency hit. Bloomberg Markets. Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-28/china-s-three-biggest-airlines-face-1-3-billion-currency-losses

Minkoff, Y. (2016). Boeing weighs new engine for biggest 737 max. Seeking Alpha. Retrieved from http://seekingalpha.com/news/3186189-boeing-weighs-new-engine-biggest-737-max

Mushaike, N. (2015). Why Boeing investors should worry over the COMAC C919?. Amigobulls. Retrieved from http://amigobulls.com/articles/why-boeing-investors-should-worry-over-the-comac-c919

Mutzabaugh, B. (2016). Now flying: China’s first modern passenger jet enters service. USA Today. Retrieved from http://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/flights/todayinthesky/2016/06/30/now-flying-chinas-first-modern-passenger-jet-enters-service/86549178/

Perrett, B. (2013). C919 may be largely limited to Chinese market. AviationWeek & Space Technology. Retrieved from http://aviationweek.com/awin/c919-may-be-largely-limited-chinese-market

Polek, G. (2016). CFM leak-1C wins certification as C919 approaches first flight. AINonline. Retrieved from http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/air-transport/2016-12-21/cfm-leap-1c-wins-certification-c919-approaches-first-flight

RAND Corporation. (2014). China faces several obstacles to building successful domestic commercial aircraft industry. RAND. Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/news/press/2014/04/04.html

SCMP Staff. (2017). In pictures: C919, China’s answer to Airbus A320 and Boeing B737, set to make debut flight. South China Morning Post. Retrieved from http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2068527/pictures-c919-chinas-answer-airbus-a320-and-boeing-b737

The Commercial Space Industry

Is Commercial Space Tourism a viable industry? Please answer the following questions:

1) Historical background: When did the idea of "space tourism" begin? How has it developed? What have been the hurdles and accomplishments? Start in the 1960's - present day.

The idea of ‘space tourism’ and commercial spaceflight began on April 28, 2001, with American businessman Dennis Tito. Dennis Tito became the first space tourist as he utilized his monetary resources to buy a seat on a Russian Soyuz spacecraft (Wall 2011). Dennis Tito initially signed a contract in June 2000, with MirCorp to acquire a ride on a Russian spacecraft to their Mir Space Station, however his initial plan failed due to Russia decommissioning the old space station (which burned up in the atmosphere 1 year later) (Wall 2011). Consequently, Dennis Tito signed a contract with Space Adventures to facilitate his goal of venturing into space as a tourist. Against strong recommendations from other aeronautical space organizations, primarily NASA, Russia accepted Tito’s offer, which did not sit well with the other organizations. NASA and the other space organizations that opposed Tito’s mission did everything in their legal power to prevent him from venturing into space, however their efforts were to no avail. Despite his age, Dennis Tito completed the necessary physical training and passed the required medical examination outside of Moscow, Russia, to qualify for the space flight. Tito launched into orbit on April 28, 2001, spent six days aboard the space station, and landed safely in Kazakhstan on May 6, 2001 (Wall 2011). Albeit Dennis Tito faced much adversity from notable space organizations (e.g. NASA) and spent approximately $20 million to attain a seat aboard the Russian spacecraft, he continually pursued and accomplished his goal. Thereby, Dennis Tito demonstrated the commercial space industry was potentially viable for private citizens and other wealthy individuals, ergo giving birth to the idea of ‘space tourism’ single-handedly.

‘Space Tourism’ has developed in a significant manner since its initial inception/creation by Dennis Tito in 2001; back when Dennis Tito first ventured into space as a tourist, it was viewed as an exclusive privilege only to those who had possessed a ‘millionaire’ status. However, because the newfound industry has been deemed viable and several companies have embarked on servicing individuals interested in ‘space tourism’, it has allowed for the development of other forms of ‘space tourism’. For instance, the development of the industry has resulted in both orbital and suborbital services being offered to tourist interested in commercial space (Dinerman 2015). Additionally, suborbital rocket flight (starting in 2016) is another facet of the industry that is making headway as it offers the same characteristics of a space flight, rather in a different form (and possibly at a cheaper cost). Furthermore, companies such as Virgin Galactic and Xcor Aerospace have taken to the commercial space industry, becoming competitors within the market in terms of building and launching spacecraft that will provide paying passengers with several minutes of weightlessness and a ‘bird’s eye view’ of the earth (Dinerman 2015). If this ‘co-evolution’ between the two companies continues, then they will potentially develop the technology needed to increase their launch limit from once per day to twice per day (and so on). This also makes the possibility of multiple aircraft launching at one time and/or multiple times per day a reality even if it is 10 to 15 years in the future.

One of the biggest hurdles for anything within the aviation industry and/or the FAA is safety, and the concept of ‘space tourism’ is no exception to this notion. Obviously, when conducting operations that include launching ordinary civilians into space there are several innate risks imposed upon both the passengers and the non-participating general public beneath them. Ensuring the safety of the non-participating public as well as making sure the passengers embarking on these ‘space flights’ has been a major hurdle for the companies conducting these commercial space flights. According to Antczak (2004), the primary concerns of governing authorities regulating ‘space tourism’ (i.e. the FAA) is maximizing the safety of the uninvolved public and ensuring the space tourist truly understand all the risks associated with commercial space travel (e.g. adverse effects of G-forces). To mitigate the adverse effect G-forces have on the average civilian, the FAA conducted various studies evaluating how said forces will affect the human physiologically to derive an approximate medical fitness passengers will need to have to qualify for commercial space flight (Antczak 2004). Furthermore, extensive medical questionnaires have been created by said companies (that presumably require a sign-off from the primary physician) to be given to potential passengers to assess their health, ensure they understand any and all risks involved, and make an informed decision (i.e. give consent) to participate.

The perception of safety, or lack thereof, from the public’s perspective is yet another hurdle the commercial space industry has been forced to endure and overcome. Aside from maximizing the safety of the passengers and non-participating public, the commercial space operators must also ensure their crew (and spacecraft) are knowledgeable in addition to performing safe practices/procedures. The crash of the first SpaceShipTwo (SS2) spacecraft operated by Virgin Galactic in October 2014, created an enormous safety hurdle for commercial space operators, especially since the accident was determined to be caused by pilot error. The accident occurred near Mojave, CA, and killed one crewmember while severely injuring the other; the NTSB determined the co-pilot activated the spacecraft’s ‘feathering’ mechanism too soon, proximately causing the crash (Dinerman 2015). Any aviation related crash will cause a declined perception of safety amongst the public, especially those who do not use and/or are familiar with aviation. However, the fact this crash and the subsequent death of a crewmember occurred within a relatively new and extremely high-risk (and unheard of) industry, the safety hurdle created was significantly magnified. Consequently, the general public and potential passengers were severely unnerved (as expected), which means commercial space operators have to work much harder to not only increase the safety of their operation, but to also earn back the consumer trust that was lost.

There were several significant and extremely noteworthy accomplishments pertaining to the notion of commercial space flight, the earliest of which date back to the 1960s/70s. The first human in space was Yuri Gagarin, who was from Russia and orbited the Earth for 108 minutes on April 12, 1961, via the Vostok 1 capsule. This however, was not the first space-related accomplishment for the Soviet Union (during the Cold War Era), as they were also the first country to send an artificial satellite in space, namely the Sputnik 1, in October 1957 (Wall 2011). The United Stated accomplished a tremendous feat on their own when they launched Alan Shppeard into space via the Freedom 7 spacecraft on May 5, 1961. Alan Sheppard’s successful launch and orbit in space (which lasted for approximately 15 minutes) made him the second human in space. Experts say that albeit Sheppard’s flight was much shorter than Gagarin’s, his was more efficient because Sheppard (manually) controlled the spacefcraft rather than allowing it to be automated like Gagarin’s flight. The first woman in space was also from the Soviet Union; Valentina Tereshkova launched into space via the Vostok 6 spacecraft, completed 48 orbits of Earth, stayed in space for almost three days, and made history on June 16, 1963, which was yet another major accomplishment of the (potential) commercial space industry (during its infancy) (Wall 2011). Alexey Leonov, who was from the Soviet Union, conducted the first ever spacewalk on March 18, 1965, which lasted for 12 minutes. 3 years later, the United States experienced another accomplishment when the Apollo 8 spacecraft circled the moon on Dec. 21, 1968, after making 1.5 orbits around the Earth (Wall 2011). Perhaps one the most notable accomplishments was the Apollo 11 space mission, occurring on July 20, 1969, where NASA astronauts Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin stepped foot on the moon. The first space station was launched by the Soviet Union on April 19, 1971; although the space station did not last in outer space long (approximately 6 months), the feat was accomplished and the idea of sustaining life in outer space (aboard a station) was now a possibility (Wall 2011).

As science and technology advanced, so did the complexity of NASA’s space missions; on April 12, 1981, the Columbia space shuttle conducted its maiden flight becoming the first reusable spaceship. This set the tone for NASA’s future in regards to their spaceflight program, types of missions to be conducted, and their means to safely transport astronauts to and from outer space (Wall 2011). As previously mentioned, the Soviet Union’s first space station created the idea that life in outer space was sustainable if the proper facility was established. With that in mind, the United States with help from the Russian, Canadian, European, and Japanese space agencies built the International Space Station (ISS) at a cost of $100 billion. History was then made on November 2, 2000, when the ISS was boarded by three astronauts who stayed/lived aboard the station for more than 120 days (Wall 2011).

As mentioned earlier, present day commercial space tourism has developed in quite an exponential fashion, primarily due to private operators. The company that truly ‘lifted’ the idea of space tourism and made it a reality with present day technology is known as Scaled Composites, led by the famous aerospace engineer Burt Rutan. He and his team built the SpaceShipOne and launched it into suborbital space, twice, in a matter of five days in the fall of 2004 (Wall 2011). This notable accomplishment not only won them a $10 million prize, but their innovative spacecraft design laid the framework for the creation of the SpaceShipTwo (SS2), which would later become used in Virgin Galactic’s space tourism operations. With the essential schematics for the SS2 spacecraft in mind, Virgin Galactic set their sights on the business potential space tourism had to offer, which lead to the establishment of ticket prices at $200,000/seat for the inexplicable experience of ‘weightless enjoyment’ (with hopes to start rides in 2012). Further developing and enhancing the reality of commercial space tourism was Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX). On December 8, 2010, SpaceX made history by becoming the first private company/operator to launch a spacecraft into orbit and successfully recover it after re-entry (Wall 2011). To conduct this launch, they utilized their Dragon capsule spacecraft and attached it to a Flacon 9 rocket. This phenomenal feat accomplished by SpaceX set the tone for future commercial space escapades (and potential passenger flights) by showing governing officials and other opposing forces/bodies that commercial space flight can and will be done sooner, rather than later.

2) Give a brief summary of the rules and regulations that currently govern the commercial space industry. When and why were they developed? Start with the first rules developed in the 1980s. Do you feel that they are appropriate or that the need to be more or less restrictive?

The first rules that governed the commercial space industry were created in 1984 by the Commercial Space Launch Act, which authorized the Department of Transportation (DOT) and subsequently, the FAA, to oversee, authorize, and regulate the office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST). Consequently, the FAA was now responsible for the regulation of both launches and reentries of launch and reentry vehicles in addition to the operation of launch and reentry sites operating by U.S. citizens and/or within the U.S. (Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], 2016). Furthermore, the act granted the FAA the right to exercise their responsibility consistent with public health (i.e. of passengers and the non-participating public), safety of property, and national security. Essentially, this act granted the FAA the power to govern and establish additional, more restrictive regulations over the commercial space sector to ensure safety of those involved.

The current rules and regulations that govern the commercial space industry outline the human space flight requirements for the crew and paying passengers. According to the FAA (2016), the current regulations aim to maximize and ensure the safety of the non-participating public and implement measures to enable passengers to make informed decisions regarding their personal health and safety prior to embarking on a commercial space flight. This assurance of informed decision-making will potentially be facilitated in the form of extensive health/safety questionnaires that assess various aspects of the passenger’s health. The forms will also explain the adverse affects suborbital travel can have on their body (along with other innate risk), and explain how they can be disqualified at the first sign of medical trouble. The purpose of this is to influence the making of an informed decision on their behalf. The regulations also require the launch vehicle operators to provide certain safety-related info, identify what an operator must do to conduct a licensed launch with a (human) passenger aboard, and require the operator to inform the passengers of the innate risks pertaining to space travel (as mentioned previously) (FAA 2016). Furthermore, the regulations require that all space flight participants undergo and successfully complete training and general security briefings prior to their flight as means to ensure passengers are cognizant of the commercial space protocol. The current regulations also explain the pilot/crew requirements, which state pilots must least hold a pilot certificate with an instrument rating (military experience is preferred) and possess a current 2^nd class medical certificate. The crew and/or operator must verify the integrated performance of the space vehicle’s hardware and any software within the operational environment prior to any passenger being permitted to board the spacecraft. The verification process includes flight-testing of the hard- and software in addition to other diagnostic evaluations (FAA 2016).

The regulations that initially governed commercial space transportation were originally developed in 1984, but as science and technology advanced, amendments to the regulations needed to be made, ergo the more recent regulations implemented in 2016. The current regulations were developed to provide structure, organization, and most importantly, safety, to an industry that was dynamic, new, and previously unheard of (thus there were no akin regulations already in place). To get ahead of the curve, the FAA and other governing bodies recognized that commercial space transportation (and space tourism) was a viable industry that would amass popularity and interest as technology advanced. Therefore, since they were bestowed with the governing responsibility of regulating such an industry, they were obligated to create all-encompassing regulations that were fair, thorough, and maximized the safety of the crew, passengers, and the uninvolved public.

I feel as if the current regulations governing commercial space transportation are appropriate because they adequately cover all aspects of the industry, especially the safety of those participating and those that are uninvolved. I believe the proactive push by the FAA in making private commercial operators implement training programs for their passengers will not only increase safety aboard the flight, but will also mitigate certain innate risk the passengers assume since they are more knowledgeable of the proper procedures (and of the spacecraft/operation itself). I also feel the stipulation within the current regulations that emphasizes informed consent of the passengers is adequately appropriate, and not to mention, vital to their safety and that of the operation and industry. By thoroughly explaining all the risks associated with commercial space travel and providing an extensive self-assessment of one’s health, the FAA has enhanced a positive safety culture within this sector by making sure passengers know what they are subjecting themselves (and their bodies) to prior to travel. The aspect of the regulations I feel and have seen most people having an issue with are the crew requirements. Some feel that only possessing an instrument rating and second class medical are not enough, rather space pilots should possess at least a commercial certificate, have extensive military piloting experience, and over 2,500 hours. Although increasing the pilot requirements would (theoretically) increase safety by attracting more experienced pilots, too much restriction is not necessarily a good thing. Implementing too restrictive of regulations diminishes the number of qualified individuals, which results in less operators conducting missions, potential over-working of the current crew (i.e. fatigue), and possible loss of viability of the industry. Thus, I feel the current regulations in place are a ‘happy-medium’ as they adequately address all aspects of the commercial space industry.

3) Where do you see space tourism headed and in what time frame? I.e., do you think it will be accessible to the general public, not unlike the commercial airline industry? Do you think it will develop into a means of transportation or do you think that it will perpetually exists as a one-time, bucket list adventure? Why?

I see space tourism headed in a positive direction in an expeditious fashion; meaning, I feel as if the commercial space industry stays on the course it is now, then space tourism will shift from a ‘wealthy exclusive’ privilege to an opportunity even middle-class people can seize (i.e. accessible to the general public). While space tourism is still in its infancy, more or less, I only foresee those who are extremely wealthy (i.e. millionaire status) being able to afford commercial space travel. I say this because commercial space operators are still working out all the ‘kinks’ stemming from their operations and the FAA is still amending/creating regulations that will ensure the safety of those involved. Technology and safety are two things that are very expensive and take time to implement; thus, the only way for these (private) commercial space operators to thrive long enough to provide flight opportunities for all is to charge an astronomical amount of money for a space ticket, of which only the independently wealthy population can afford. Therefore, in 10-15 years, once space tourism and the commercial space industry has solidified itself in aviation permanently, I believe space tourism will be more financially accessible to a greater majority of citizens.

I do not foresee commercial space travel transpiring into a viable means of transportation primarily because of the strenuous health/safety regulations required for passengers to be eligible for a flight and the significant cost of a seat. Frequent flyers that fly commercially already feel as if the TSA policies and procedures are ‘too much’ and ‘unnecessary’ whenever they encounter a delay at the security lines. Although TSA can be an inconvenience, the fact passengers view the ‘assurance of safety practices’ as too much makes it hard for me to believe they would be accepting of the extensive commercial space flight health requirements, assessments, and subsequent (physiological) training. According to Carrington (2013), the cost to purchase one seat on a Virgin Galactic flight is $250,000; this includes other amenities such as training, lodging, etc., but in order for this to be converted into a viable means of transportation, it would still cost an astronomical amount of money. Thus, even if the cost was lowered to $10,000, I highly doubt consumers (aside from those who are independently wealthy) would pay that large sum of money, especially large families, to go from point A to B when they could drive, take the train or bus, or fly (if international) and save money. With that said, I believe the commercial space flight will remain a routine escapade for those who can afford it, but will eventually transpire into a mere ‘bucket list’ thing to do for other civilians that are not as monetarily fortune. As I said, even if the cost per seat was lessened to $10,000 and/or a family package discount was established, most people would only be willing to spend that type of money for a ‘once in a life-time’ experience. 

4) What are the qualifications to work in the space tourism industry  - either from the pilot or the management perspective? This may require some research, perhaps even making a phone call.

The current qualifications to work in the space tourism industry as a pilot surprised me as they were more interesting than those for management personnel. I also found the pilot qualifications to be much more strenuous than those of an airline pilot, for obvious reasons. The basic qualifications established by the FAA for an individual to work as a pilot in the space tourism industry are that they must possess a current FAA certificate with an instrument ration in addition to a current Class 1 medical certificate (Goehlich et al., 2013). Additionally, space tourism operators have an extreme preference for pilots that have experience and training in aircraft operation while wearing a pressurized suit in high-altitude environments (since it is akin to suborbital flight). In other words, to satisfy this qualification, space tourism operators would like pilots to have previous military fighter jet experience. Thorough experience and training in emergency procedures and crew coordination is yet another qualification these operators have established. However, because this industry deals with and operates in high-altitude and suborbital flight at higher speeds, space tourism operators have a strong preference for military fighter jet pilots because they tend to have more experience with expeditious, rational decision-making at higher speeds and less time (as opposed to an airline pilot) (Goehlich et al., 2013).

In addition to possessing at least an FAA certificate with an instrument rating, Class 1 medical certificate, the knowledge, experience, and skills to fly an aircraft, pilots interested in space tourism flight must enhance their academic background by taking additional courses to learn about suborbital flight in efforts to ensure proficiency. Successful completion of the following courses are required and considered basic academic qualifications: Advanced aerodynamics, rocket mechanics, aerospace physiology, high-altitude operations, ballistic flight, re-entry procedures, navigation, powerless flight, and emergency procedures (relating to suborbital operation) (Goehlich et al., 2013). Possessing a thorough understanding of all the courses previously mentioned is essential for all pilots seeking to become involved in space tourism because they are necessary to ensure the safety of the crew, passengers, and the non-participating public.

According to Goehlich et al., (2013), pilots interested in the space tourism industry must also qualify with respects to their piloting skill set(s), which is tested and honed through hands-on experience (in an actual aircraft) to simulate suborbital flight. As with anything, practice makes perfect, and when dealing with the new suborbital flight environment and aircraft, pilots must meet the qualifications and successfully master the three phases of suborbital flight, which are boost, re-entry, and glide (Goehlich et al., 2013). Of these three previously mentioned phases, the boost phase is the most dangerous; consequently, it requires the most pilot training and proficiency, thus it is considered a necessary qualification.

Therefore, although the FAA says all a pilot looking to work within the space tourism industry needs is an instrument rating, Class 1 medical certificate, and sufficient aircraft operation knowledge, the fact is that the private space operators are truly looking for experienced military fighter pilots because of their discipline, ‘seasoned’ skill set, previous physiological training and endurance, and decreased environmental acclimation time.

References

Antczak, J. (2004). Space tourism industry faces safety hurdles. The Union-Turbine. Retrieved from http://legacy.sandiegouniontribune.com/uniontrib/20041007/news_1n7space.html

Carrington, D. (2013). What does a $250,000 ticket to space with Virgin Galactic actually buy you?. CNN Travel. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/15/travel/virgin-galactic-250000-ticket-to-space/

Dinerman, T. (2015). 2016 could be the year space tourism takes off. Observer. Retrieved from http://observer.com/2015/09/2016-could-be-the-year-space-tourism-takes-off/

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). (2016). New regulations govern private human space flight requirements for crew and space flight participants. Office of Commercial Space Transportation. Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/human_space_flight_reqs/

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). (2016). Regulations. Office of commercial space transportation. Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/regulations/

Goehlich, R. A., Anderson, J. K., Harrold, N. N., Bemis, J. A., Nettleingham, M. T., Cobin, J. M., … Ilchena, N. Y. (2013). Pilots for space tourism. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. Retrieved from https://commons.erau.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=ww-graduate-studies

Wall, M. (2011). First space tourist: how a U.S. millionaire bought a ticket to orbit. Private Spaceflight. Retrieved from http://www.space.com/11492-space-tourism-pioneer-dennis-tito.html

Wall, M. (2011). Giant leaps: biggest milestones of human spaceflight. Spaceflight. Retrieved from http://www.space.com/11329-human-spaceflight-biggest-moments-50th-anniversary.html