The Cargo Industry & Their Exemption From New Regulations

Please answer the following questions:

1) As a result of the Colgan Air accident, the FAA institute new flight and duty regulations. Summarize these new regulations and describe how they are different from the old flight and duty regulations.

The new flight and duty regulations stemming from the Colgan Air accident in 2009, addressed the chronic and growing issue of pilot fatigue in a holistic fashion. The FAA revised the majority, if not all, of the old regulations pertaining to crewmember (i.e. pilot) flight and duty time primarily by mitigating duty time (i.e. lessening the number of hours a pilot can work that constitute a legal work day) and clarifying the regulatory language.

The new regulations were implemented via an FAA final rule in December 2011. The purpose of the reformation of the flight and duty rules was to address, combat, and mitigate the increasing problem of fatigue within the industry as it imposed a severely adverse impact upon the safety of airline employees and traveling passengers. There were nine amendments and/or new stipulations encompassed within the new set of regulations, which are summarized as follows: 1. There is a single rule for all kinds of operations (e.g. domestic, international, unscheduled, etc.), thereby no differentiation of rest requirements will be subjected to pilots based upon the type of operation; 2. There is joint responsibility between the pilot and the airline to ensure the pilot is fit to fly, of which the pilot must denote by signing a form stating they are ‘fit for duty’ prior to being released for a flight (and if the pilot states they are fatigued, then they are not allowed to fly); 3. Annual fatigue education training programs must be adopted by airlines to promote awareness amongst employees; 4. A split duty period that is applied to operations, which requires a pilot to sleep/rest for at least three hours during the flight duty period (FDP); 5. The FDP is limited based upon the time the FDP begins and the number of segments a pilot has flown; 6. For a reserve status pilot, said pilot must be granted a rest period amounting to at least 10 consecutive hours immediately beginning the reserve period; 7. Cumulative limitations were implemented, which lessened the FDP hours during any week and four-week period as well as any flight time for any four-week period and any 365-day period; 8. The pilot rest period requires 10 hours of rest, 8 of which must be an uninterrupted sleep opportunity; 9. The ability to reduce a pilot’s rest has been rescinded entirely (Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], 2011).

These new regulations, summarized in the preceding paragraph, differ from the previous flight and duty regulations quite significantly. For instance, with the old regulations, there used to be different rest requirements for pilots based upon the type of operation (e.g. domestic, international, or unscheduled) conducted. However, the new regulations do not call for such a distinction, rather all pilots are subjected to the same rest requirements regardless of the operation (Houston 2016).

Additionally, the language within the new regulations is much more specific and clear, leaving no room for ambiguity or for the regulation to be misconstrued on behalf of the pilot or the airline. For example, the old regulations did not provide clear or specific language and/or proper evaluation to determine whether the pilot was ‘fit for duty’. However, the new regulations require the pilot and the airline share the task of determining whether if said pilot is eligible, or ‘fit’ to fly, in addition to the implementation of a document the pilot must sign stating they are ‘fit for duty’ prior to being released for a flight. If the pilot claims they are fatigued, then by law, the airline cannot release the pilot for duty, and the pilot must be granted a rest period (FAA, 2011).

One significant difference between the new and old regulations is that the new regulations require the airline to implement and provide an annual fatigue education and awareness training program for their pilots, dispatchers, and other operational individuals, of which was not required at all per the old regulations (FAA, 2011).

Perhaps, the most significant and prominent differences between the new and old regulations were the amendments to the rest period (and concept of reduced rest). The new regulations require a 10-hour rest period, of which 8 hours must constitute an uninterrupted sleep opportunity, while the old regulations stated 9 hours of that rest period could be reduced to 8 hours. Furthermore, the old regulations completely excluded the stipulation of an uninterrupted sleep opportunity. Additionally, the new regulations eliminated the concept of ‘reducible rest’, which the old regulations allowed for a pilot’s rest to be reduced to 8 hours (from 9 or more hours) (FAA, 2011).

The difference between the new and old flight and duty regulations is extremely significant and definitely note-worthy. The FAA has revamped the parameters of flight and duty time for crewmembers in a holistic fashion by providing clear and specific language, implementing procedures/documentation to ensure employees are ‘fit’ to perform their duties, and requiring fatigue training annually to promote awareness and increase safety/health. Thus, albeit it is extremely unfortunate that it took for a commercial aviation accident, namely the Colgan Air accident in 2009, for these new flight and duty regulations to be instituted by the FAA, I believe these regulations will prove to be extremely beneficial. Specifically, the new regulations will provide an improved safety environment for the airlines, their passengers, and the industry as a whole, in addition to improving the mental, physical, and emotional health of the affected crewmembers.

2) Cargo carriers are exempt from the Part 117 rules. What are the current flight and duty limitations for cargo carriers?

Since cargo carriers are exempt from the new Part 117 flight and duty regulations, the cargo carriers must abide by the previous (i.e. pre-December 2011) pilot/crew member flight and duty limitations/regulations. This means that cargo pilots are subjected to the old flight and duty rest rules previously mentioned in the preceding paragraph. For example, cargo pilots are allotted different rest requirements depending on whether they conduct a domestic, international, or unscheduled leg, where as the new regulations prohibit rest differentiation between operations. Additionally, the language pertaining to the determination if a pilot is 'fit to fly' is still vague and/or ambiguous, plus there is no documentation that needs to be signed for a cargo pilot to state if he/she is 'fit' to fly. In contrast, the new regulations specify and clarify language constituting the definition of ‘fatigue’ in addition to requiring the signage of a 'fit for duty' document (Houston 2016). One of the biggest complaints from pilots working in the cargo industry is chronic and severe fatigue due to conducting flights throughout various times of the night/early morning, long hours, and conducting multiple legs within one working day. One prominent and significant stipulation of the old flight and duty regulations that adversely impacts cargo pilots is that their designated rest period of 9 hours can be reduced (i.e. ‘reducible rest’) to 8 hours, while the new regulations under Part 117 require pilots receive a minimum rest period of 10 hours, with the opportunity to attain at least 8 hours of uninterrupted sleep (Houston 2016). Albeit I have only listed three aspects of the old flight and duty regulations, the ones I have listed tend to have the most adverse impact on pilot mental and physical health (i.e. influence fatigue).

Since cargo carriers are exempt from Part 117 and the subsequent new regulations, the cargo operators tend to take advantage of the ambiguous language and construe it to their benefit at the expense of the safety and health of their employees. In other words, because of the lack of clarity within the regulatory language defining ‘fatigue’ coupled with the fact there is no requirement for a ‘fatigue document’ to be signed prior to release, cargo operators are able to essentially ‘push the envelope’ with their pilots. They tend to accomplish this by having their pilots work a regular duty day (i.e. 8 hours) up to 16 hours, provide them with the legal amount of rest, which is 9 hours (that can be reduced to 8 hours per the old regulations), and then assign them to conduct another flight. This continuous pattern of being overworked daily since their flights are assigned back-to-back, only receiving 8 hours of rest (maximum), takes a strenuous toll on their body, which causes severe and chronic fatigue to set in by third or fourth day. Often, this same schedule continues weekly, which enhances the sleep-debt accrual and fatigue endured by the pilots to the point where two to three off days is not nearly enough to allow their mental, physical, and emotional health to recover entirely before they return back to work. Thereby, their level of intellect, safety, and job proficiency is significantly diminished. It is at this point where the risk (due to increased fatigue) and the likeliness of an incident/accident to occur are great, ergo the reason for the implementation for the new regulations.

In light of the Colgan Air accident in 2009, the FAA and all other aviation operators, especially those operating under Parts 121 and 135, have taken great strides to address, combat, and mitigate crewmember fatigue. According to the FAA (2011), cargo carriers in particular have improved their resting facilities (e.g. crew rooms, crash pads, and other housing accommodations) to house their crewmembers while the cargo is loaded and/or unloaded throughout the night (until the aircraft is ready to depart). Albeit the cargo carriers were exempt from the new flight and duty regulations set froth by the FAA and consequently, must abide by the older regulations, they have the option to adopt the new regulations. The adoption of the new regulations is strongly encouraged by the FAA, as it would increase the safety aspect of cargo operations (FAA 2011). However, if cargo operators decide to adopt the new regulations, then they must comply with all of its stipulations, which may prove to be extremely costly (and be of more financial harm than good), ergo the reason why cargo carriers have opted to remain under the old regulations.

3) Why do you feel that cargo carriers have been excluded from the new changes? Value of life? Public perception? Too much money for the carrier? Other reasons? All the above? You may find that reading the preamble of the final rule is helpful in answering this question.

I believe the primary reason why cargo carriers have been excluded from the new flight and duty regulations is because of the inefficient monetary costs and benefits of including them. According to Carey (2011), Part 121 carriers have two years to be in compliance with the new regulations (i.e. by December 2013). The compliance cost of the new regulations is estimated to vary between $297 and $390 million. While this is an extraordinary amount of money, the monetary benefits of implementing the new regulations manifest in the form of safety, with respects to less accidents and subsequent expenses (e.g. cost to replace an aircraft, benefits for injured passengers and crew, infrastructure damages, etc.). The benefits of the new regulations are estimated to save Part 121 carriers approximately between $247 and $470 million (FAA 2011). This equates to an approximate savings between $80 and $173 million that Part 121 carriers (and the commercial industry) will retain, which can be allocated towards other improvements such as those regarding airline or airport safety and infrastructure.

Albeit the new regulations will prove to be extremely cost beneficial for Part 121 carriers, the same cannot be said for cargo carriers, hence their exemption from the rule. The FAA projected the estimated costs of implementing the new flight and duty regulations within the cargo industry at $306 million dollars, exceeding that of Part 121 carriers by $16 million. Furthermore, the estimated monetary benefits of said regulatory implementation within the cargo industry is approximately $20 million to $32 million. This monetary benefit was calculated as the avoidance of one fatal all-cargo accident of which is substantially less than the avoidance of a Part 121 (commercial) aviation accident (Carey 2011). Thus, the costs associated with the institution of new regulations within the cargo industry would extremely outweigh the benefits by an amount varying between $274 and $286 million. Therefore, the only reason why I believe cargo carriers were excluded from the new flight and duty regulations stemmed from the cost-inefficiency and the inability of the cargo carriers to comply with the regulations.

If the new regulations were applied to cargo industry, cargo carriers (and the industry) would lose a maximum of $286 million, while the implementation within the commercial carriers is going to save them a maximum of $173 million. The FAA further strengthened this monetary notion of exclusion, which stated, “Covering cargo operators under the new rule would be too costly compared to the benefits generated in this portion of the industry” (FAA 2011). Although the FAA stated the reason why cargo carriers were excluded from the new regulations was due to cost-inefficiency, this leads me to believe the FAA values the lives of those working in the cargo industry less than that of those working in the commercial (i.e. passenger carrying) industry. Even though the cargo pilots are transporting cargo rather than passengers, the pilots are not ‘expendable’ and should not be viewed as such by the FAA, thus they should have (new) flight and duty regulations akin to those of Part 121 carriers.

4) Do you believe cargo carriers should be included in the new rules? Why or why not?

I do not believe cargo carriers should be included in the new regulations not only because of the excessive monetary costs to implement them, but due to the fact that cargo carriers should have their own set of regulations. With that said, I believe cargo operators/pilots should have their own flight and duty regulations that are akin to the Part 121 carriers because cargo pilots operate in different conditions and times of day (i.e. night flying) than commercial carriers. However, at the end of the day, the cargo pilots are human, just like the passenger carrying pilots, and can experience/suffer from the same type of mental, physical, and emotional fatigue. The previous regulations (now current for the current cargo industry) governing the commercial passenger industry have proved to be extremely inefficient and detrimental to air transport safety, ergo the new regulations. Since the old regulations were replaced within Part 121, I feel the cargo industry should also be granted their own, affordable, and befitting set of regulations to ultimately improve the health of cargo pilots and improve the safety within the cargo industry.

5) Finally, what would be the impact to your career if cargo carriers were to be included in these new rules - Pilots, address this from a pilot perspective, management address from a management perspective.

If cargo carriers were to be included in the new regulations, my (management) career would be impacted in a significant fashion in terms of the responsibility for crewmember and employee training, education, and awareness. As part of the managerial staff, my role would focus around the creation and implementation of an efficient fatigue (and wellness) awareness-training program in efforts to ensure pilots and other employees are knowledgeable in how to recognize, address, and combat fatigue. Furthermore, I would be responsible for making sure all the employees, especially the pilots, remained in compliance with all the flight and duty regulations to create and maintain a safe working environment, both on the ground and in the cockpit.

On the other hand, if the cargo carriers were to be included in the new rules, from a management perspective, the addition could potentially cause confusion and/or delay within the legislative/regulatory facet of the FAA (and the industry as a whole) since notable efforts and monies would need to be invested to derive and/or amend the current regulations to suit the cargo sector.

References

Carey, B. (2011). FAA issues pilot duty rule, excludes cargo carriers. AINonline. Retrieved from http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/2011-12-23/faa-issues-pilot-duty-rule-excludes-cargo-carriers

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). (2011). Fact sheet-pilot fatigue rule comparison. Federal Aviation Administration. Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=13273

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). (2011). Press release-FAA issues final rule on pilot fatigue. Federal Aviation Administration. Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=13272

Houston, S. (2016). FAA final rule: pilot duty and rest requirements. Aviation and aerospace. Retrieved from https://www.thebalance.com/faa-final-rule-pilot-duty-and-rest-requirements-282927